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Second nature 
 
Abstract: Are ontological meanings somehow sacrosanct in arguments 
concerning psychology – particularly those scored by discursive accounts of 
human being?  Or is the purposeful deferment of ontological concerns in 
discursive psychology (DP) another instance of method-fetishism (Koch, 
1981)?  Shotter’s (1995) understanding of joint action and Chouliaraki’s 
(2002) critical realist account of social action combine to support an alternate 
position to the predominant discursive psychological approach informed by 
epistemological constructionism (DPEC).  The DPEC position is here 
contrasted with a discursive psychological approach informed by ontological 
constructionism (DPOC).  Via this distinction, a path for future discursive 
psychological studies is charted, one which values understanding the kinds of 
practical-moral knowledges (Shotter, 1993) available to people in accounting 
for themselves and their actions as psychosocial agents.  Contrary to claims 
that the DPEC/DPOC distinction is supercilious (Edley, 2001) or oxymoronic 
(Drewery, 2000), the importance of debating what ontology can mean for 
psychology is herein seen as central to the pursuit of personal, relational and 
collective wellness in contemporary life.      
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Introduction 
 
In English the idiom ‘second nature’ is commonly used in reference to practices or tasks 
occurring in daily life that seem straightforward, easy to accomplish or for which we 
seem to have an uncanny affinity.  In this paper the idiom is employed in two ways to 
argue a necessary and rightful place for ontological concerns in psychological accounts of 
personhood.  To start, second nature accounts are situated next to dominant versions of 
human nature presently available in psychological discourse.  The most enduring and 
pervasive forms of psychological knowledge (such as behaviourist or cognitive theories) 
have historically been explained using objectivism and reductionism and can be 
notionally understood as attempts to account for humanity’s ‘first’ nature - at least in the 
realist and essentialist ways they have been portrayed to date.  I then turn to discursive 
psychology (DP) to consider how this approach provides alternate ways of understanding 
human being.  Difficulties do however arise in DP with the separation of epistemic and 
ontological forms in social constructionism – a crucial theoretical distinction informing 
this work (Edwards, 1997).  For brevity these accounts will be referred to here as DPEC 
(discursive psychology epistemological constructionism) and DPOC (discursive 
psychology ontological constructionism).  To contrast these strands of DP input from 
both camps will be sought.  The consequences of committing to either position, both for 
the discipline and with regard the possible influence these psychological discourses may 
have in contemporary society, will also be compared.   
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First nature accounts 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines ontology as “(t)he science or study of 
being; that department of metaphysics which relates to the being or essence of things” 
(Onion, 1973, p. 1449).  This standard definition probably sets off alarm bells with many 
discourse analysts because of its essentialist overtone.  But prior to drawing any hasty 
conclusions this definition offers some indication as to how meanings connected with 
questions of ontology have been conflated.  A prima-facie case is made via the way in 
which first nature psychological accounts uncritically limit questions of human being to 
essentialist discourse as per the OED definition (cf. Bandura, 1986; Erikson, 1950; 
Seligman, 2004).  Current discipline-based activities positioned under the banner of 
positive psychology provide further illustration.  Whilst some might consider this version 
of psychology to be vastly different from other first nature accounts, particularly in how it 
approaches the study of human being, such thought is emphatically quashed by one of its 
own.  Positive psychology’s principal architect, Martin Seligman, admits that “much has 
been accomplished, enough to call it [positive psychology] a movement (but not, please, 
a paradigm shift since it uses the same tried and true methods of mainstream science to 
merely shed light on the relatively uninvestigated realm of happiness)” (ibid, p. xi).   
 
Two concerning issues present with the continued privileging of first nature accounts in 
contemporary societies.  First, that ethical issues (e.g. political influence upon social 
determinants of health) are often ignored via projections of personhood as a closed 
system of atomistic events (e.g. neural pathways or psychopathological traits) and 
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second, that the appearance of systematicity confines psychological descriptions to 
discourses of constraint (e.g. deficit-based reductionisms concerning people’s potentials).  
For example, historically psychology has been interested in the production of knowledge 
made using observational procedures directed at phenomena assumed to be explicable in 
causal terms (Franken, 1988).  Such knowledge is said to be available to generalisation 
such that discernable patterns of events, obtained via empirical methods, could be used to 
support universal theoretical claims (Foley, Lockhart & Messick, 1970).  Acknowledging 
the intended purpose and values supporting first nature accounts will contribute to 
exposing the ‘tried and true’ means through which these presume their supremacy in 
mainstream psychological discourse.  These issues are vitally important to consider in 
accounting for the nature of human being because discursive processes like these 
continue to play an influential role in generating universal accounts of personhood 
(Gergen, 1991).   
 
Making room for second nature accounts 
 
Following Wittgenstein (1953), the language games in which communicative action takes 
place occur through the use of tools (e.g. words) and actions (e.g. 
speech/conversation/utterances) and within our many ‘forms of life’, including 
psychological practices, their use is understood as contestable and open to negotiation.  
The implications are pronounced, as Shotter points out: 
 
 5
…the ‘grounds’ for our claims to knowledge ultimately are to be found in who 
we ‘are’, in our forms of life.  For it is in our socialisation into a certain way 
of being that we learn how to do such things as making claims, raising 
questions, conducting arguments, sensing disagreements, recognising 
agreements, and so on.  These ontological skills – these ways of being a 
certain kind of socially competent, first-person member of our society – are 
necessary for there to be any questions, or arguments, at all (1993, p. 78; 
emphasis in original).  
 
Shotter (1995) talks about social practices or joint action as responsive activities in which 
practical-moral psychological knowledge directs what goes on for those involved.  Put 
simply, human beings answer (i.e. we act) in response to the calls made within our 
dialogically structured contexts.  As stated above, this intricate bond between who we 
ontologically ‘are, in our forms of life’ and how knowledge of this is understood exists in 
the language practices facilitated in discipline-based work and everyday activities.  But if 
personhood – not just yours or mine but humanity as it is known -  is always in process, 
always under construction, the tendering of conclusive first nature accounts not only 
limits availabilities for description in the here-and-now but also restricts constitutive 
potentials for future being.  Wittgenstein, acknowledging this concern, issued this 
warning: “We feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is 
directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of 
phenomena” (1953, no. 90). 
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Wittgenstein directs psychological considerations to the provision of analytical 
frameworks that remain open to the potentials and possibilities of human being.  But 
attempts to make room for reflections like these have met with determined resistance 
within the academy by both writers/teachers and readers/students alike.  The way in 
which arguments in the realism/relativism debate (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995; 
McLennan, 2001) have occurred serve to highlight that the more strongly a certain belief 
is held, the wider the chasm between alternate - not opposing - views.  In fact, in 
deference to the moderate position being forwarded here, what this debate tells us is that 
when understandings are made in unconditional terms (e.g. in the realism/relativism 
debate as opposing uninterpreted versus interpreted realities) such action undermines 
earnest dialogues about psychological being.   
 
This situation may even affect students within the discipline.  In a review of Edwards’ 
Discourse and Cognition, Drewery (2000) reflects upon her hopes for the book: “I 
needed someone to do the painstaking work of convincing my constructionist students 
that they did not need to worry about losing these concepts and to show them how the 
project of cognitive psychology is repositioned by discursive psychology” (p. 79).  
According to the review the work failed to meet the mark.  Whilst I concur with Drewery 
and will momentarily discuss several shared concerns regarding the DPEC approach, I do 
not agree with her contention that ontological constructionism is an oxymoron.  As 
Drewery stated in the review, “Edwards gives no account of ‘natural phenomena’” (ibid) 
and this recognition pre-empts the possible contributions of DPOC.  The worry (as 
highlighted by the teacher and on behalf of the students) was that sufficient work had not 
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been done to meaningfully engage discourses concerning cognition.  Seemingly absent 
were theoretical options to facilitate this task.  One option which I believe steps up to the 
mark comes in the form of Shotter’s (1993) account of knowledge of the third kind and I 
will turn to discuss this further after outlining my concerns with epistemological 
constructionism.                            
 
Discursive Psychology Epistemological Constructionism (DPEC)  
 
At this juncture more needs to be said regarding the theoretical links connecting 
discursive psychology and social constructionism.  In their efforts to remain provisional, 
many discursive psychologists refrain from making an ontological commitment arguing 
that their epistemological principles disallow them from doing so.  To this end Potter 
states that his critique of psychology “comes less from developing an alternative model of 
the actor, as would be the traditional psychological way, than through developing an 
alternative understanding of language and its role in the machineries of psychological 
research and assessment” (2003, p. 791).  Curiously, discursive psychologists have 
nevertheless gone on record regarding the existence of psychological phenomena, as the 
following accounts demonstrate: 
 
Clearly language, or discourse, is not all that there is in the world, not all that 
psychology and society are made of, and not the same thing as experience, or 
reality, or feelings, or knowledge…[b]ut it is the primary work of language to 
make all those ‘other’ phenomena accountable (Edwards, 2006, p. 42). 
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…this focus on psychological phenomena does not require that psychological 
states and processes of some kind do not exist.  Rather it suggests that the 
study of such things is likely to benefit from careful attention to the specific 
practices that people are involved in and the sorts of ‘competences’ that those 
practices require (Potter, 2005, p.34).    
 
Quite so.  But whilst DPEC research emphasises the importance of accountabilities in 
discursive practice, that is, those relative to the relationships involving speakers and 
listeners in dialogue, one must wonder what else could be said by DP regarding 
participants’ ‘competences’ and their responsibilities to an “overhearing moral world” 
(Auburn, Drake & Willig, 1995, p. 364).   
 
Perhaps an example would be helpful here.  In a DPEC-oriented study Auburn et al. 
(1995) analysed police interviews involving suspects accused of committing a violent act.  
From this work the authors discerned “a basic grammar of violent accusations” (ibid, p. 
353).  One example cites how speakers use the discursive concept of footing whereby 
“speakers make it clear that they are not the authors of the utterance, but merely its 
animator.  They thereby can present the hearer with a version for which the perpetrator is 
accountable, without necessarily aligning themselves with that version” (ibid, p. 363).  In 
this instance, to achieve such distancing, Auburn et al. refer to an example in which a 
police officer directly acknowledges the unsubstantiated nature of allegations made 
against the suspect (Extract 5: “um and he alleges…”).  Auburn et al. go on to make a 
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telling statement: “A variation on this footing device is to generalise the author of the 
accusation so that it is not a specific person but a generalised moral voice” (op. cit, p. 
364; my emphasis).  In the example offered, the police officer suggests that their line of 
questioning ‘needs’ to take place (Extract 6: “the first thing I think needs to be asked…”).  
Auburn et al. contend the officer invokes this particular grammar in a defensive manner 
for to do otherwise would mean that “the participants would be failing in their 
responsibilities to the overhearing moral world if this accusation were not put and heard” 
(ibid, p. 364).  Could it not be suggested that to be considered a legitimate participant in 
the action taking place each person, police officer and suspect, speaker and listener, must 
enact their ethical responsibilities to the process by appropriately utilising basic 
grammars such as person-oriented discourses (Harré, 1998)?  And that if the moral voice 
Auburn et al. so directly point to can be understood as a supporting member of the 
existing joint action then the action invokes a ‘living impulse’ (Bakhtin, 1981) particular 
to human action and ways of being?   
 
It is worth highlighting that Auburn et al. personify this aspect of joint action by 
describing it is a voice able to contribute to the discourse at hand.  To this end the 
Bakhtinian idea of the relational Other offers much to DP and social constructionism.  
Holquist, elaborating from Bakhtin, states that “the event of existence is ‘unified’; for 
although it occurs in sites that are unique, those sites are never complete in themselves.  
They are never in any sense of the word alone” (1990, p. 24; emphasis in original).  He 
goes on to suggest that for Bakhtin, human being is “not just an event, but an event that is 
shared.  Being is simultaneity; it is always co-being” (ibid, p. 25; emphasis in original).  
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The commitment that I have been referring to in this article is one that we share, whatever 
our walk of life, in and to the construction of who we are from within our various forms 
of life.  It is not enough to point to our basic grammars and refrain from positioning 
oneself in relation to these as per the DPEC position.  As psychologists we, along with 
other professions that form and inform available discourses pertaining to human being, 
share a responsibility to acknowledge our belonging to and existence in language.  It will 
be from this acknowledgement that psychology can chart the means to create, in a 
proactive sense, a language of potentials, enablement and respect that serve as 
alternatives to the more historically dominant languages of constraint, disablement and 
disrespect.       
 
Bakhtin (1986) speaks directly to this idea in his deliberations regarding a third party pre-
existing and always present in dialogic activity.  He does so by situating discourse in an 
interindividual realm:                                                                                     
 
The word (or in general any sign) is interindividual.  Everything that is said, 
expressed, is located outside the ‘soul’ of the speaker and does not belong 
only to him.  The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker.  The author 
(speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has 
his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the author 
comes upon it also have their rights (after all, there are no words that belong 
to no one).  The word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not 
a duet, but a trio) (ibid, p. 121-122).  
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In acknowledging this third participant, the relational Other, not only is it suggested that a 
speaker address a listener, as in the police and suspect research cited above, but Bakhtin 
also suggests that “the author of the utterance, with greater or lesser awareness, 
presupposes a higher superaddressee…whose absolutely just responsive understanding is 
presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time” (1986, p. 
126; emphasis in original).  Shotter too has acknowledged the importance of reciprocity 
and responsiveness to an Other in joint action.  On this matter he states: “And what is 
crucial about…‘relationally-responsive’ understandings, as I will call them in a moment – 
is not that you ‘get the picture’, so to speak, but that as gestures, as expressive movement, 
they spontaneously ‘call’ us or ‘move’ us immediately to respond in certain ways” (2003, 
p. 5; emphasis in original).  Most importantly, for the DPOC distinction to be made 
below, is that this background can be personified and positioned as existent.  Shotter 
explains: “…although invisible, the real presences generated in our active relations with 
our surroundings have agency and, like another person, can exert that kind of personal 
force upon us” (op. cit., p. 5; emphasis in original).                
 
The importance of acknowledging and incorporating discursive action as (no less than) 
tripartite serves two purposes.  Its most important achievement moves accepted wisdom 
regarding human action beyond the confines of individualism and physicalism.  Within 
an ideology of individualism, context/situation/background is often cursorily considered 
(usually as an after-thought) when attempting to understand the action taking place.  First 
and foremost, the agency of the individual (and typically their psychobiology), will be 
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questioned when/if a person is held to account for their actions.  This prevailing 
movement supports Foucault’s notion of governmentality.  Foucault drew attention to the 
fact that as the psy-disciplines developed they did so in support of the ruling power – in 
most cases in the Western world, a democratically elected government.  In Foucault’s 
words, a “formal ontology of truth” (2000b, p. 403) is directed at a “political technology 
of the body” (1977, p. 26).  Consequently, the background of our lives, including its 
discursive practices e.g. legislation, are not held in parallel responsibility to the human 
agent for what transpires.   
 
A second advantage, made possible via an acknowledgement of the relational Other, is a 
potential commitment DPEC research avoids by bringing into play the (historical) 
existence of our moral worlds.  As Bakhtin states:  
 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical 
moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against 
thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological 
consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become 
an active participant in social dialogue.  After all, the utterance arises out of 
this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it – it does not 
approach the object from the sidelines (1981, p. 276-277).  
 
Whilst some may be concerned with Bakhtin’s use of a metaphysical parameter, he 
nullifies such concerns stating that the relational Other “is not a mystical or metaphysical 
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being (although, given certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such) – 
he [sic] is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deep analysis, can be 
revealed in it” (op. cit, p. 126-127).  This, I believe, is the point Auburn et al. were trying 
to make.  In their article they recognise (by footnote) differences between applications of 
discourse analysis in social psychological study: “One difference between these 
approaches is the extent to which they either confine themselves to a functional analysis 
or link the action orientation of discourse to an ideological or social structural 
framework” (1995, p. 385).  Even with this divulgence a critical question remains: is 
dichotomising (as opposed to say directly acknowledging) the relationship between 
synchronic and diachronic aspects of discourse the most useful way of engaging with the 
issue?   
 
Coates and Wade (2004) touch on this concern in their discursive study of Canadian 
sexual assault trial judgments.  The primary objective of their research was to consider 
ways in which judges used psychological concepts to account for a perpetrator’s act of 
sexual assault.  The authors concluded that judges’ causal attributions, used in their 
sentencing remarks, often systematically reframe the sexual assault into an unintentional 
act of non-violence thus obscuring the offender’s responsibility for the assault.  A telling 
comment made by Coates and Wade suggested that “it is not essential to take up an 
ideological position to produce and reproduce social injustice.  The simple act of 
participating in everyday, taken-for-granted discursive practices…directly and indirectly 
reproduces social injustices and impedes effective intervention” (ibid, p. 522).  Their 
study and this comment specifically are critically important, for they pinpoint two 
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important issues: firstly, they underscore a person’s involvement in various forms of life 
by their participation in discursive processes and secondly, they remind us of the duty of 
care particular to the work of psychologists and health care professionals.  Psychological 
work, be it situated in the academy, in the field or in any other context, needs to be 
constantly aware of the ways in which its own discourse can be appropriated.  Auburn et 
al., like Potter, Edwards and other DPEC researchers, can attempt to limit discussion of 
discursive action to a particular situation at hand but in doing so they may risk 
(in)directly reproducing ideological positions dominant in certain forms of life.  As 
Holquist suggested above, human being is a unified performance, the study of which 
should enhance our connectedness to each other and our world.  To this end – for where 
else (other than first nature individually focussed accounts) should psychology place its 
support? - DPEC informed work must acknowledge firstly, that the discursive positions 
they create are constitutive of human being and secondly, standing behind epistemology 
does more to disconnect our ways of being than responsibly advance a pro-active moral 
and socio-political psychology of the twenty-first century.  
 
Again, my concern here is not to diminish the worth of DPEC research.  My intent is to 
pose questions regarding what, if anything else, might be appreciated were DP to engage 
beyond the proximate context of the act?  The Auburn et al. study concluded that “a 
functional approach was most appropriate since we were chiefly concerned to illustrate 
the highly situated construction of guilt” (1995, p. 385).  Such an admission would be 
satisfactory had they not earlier in their paper made this puzzling statement in relation to 
standard pathologically-oriented disciplinary descriptions.  They said: “One consequence 
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which seems to flow from such constructions…is that the wider social meaning of the act 
of violence can become suppressed” (ibid, p. 383).  Well yes.  So too, I argue, does a 
richer understanding of our forms of life, ways of being, cultural order, and so on, 
struggle for recognition under the psychological program promoted by DPEC.  
Ultimately, we are left wondering what results might be achieved by DP drawing 
attention to ‘the wider social meaning of the act’? 
 
Discursive Psychology Ontological Constructionism (DPOC) 
 
A good friend once told me: “Any words before the word ‘but’ in a sentence are usually 
bullshit”.  This unequivocal observation echoes the concerns I have raised regarding how 
the DPEC approach is laid out.  To confirm, as many DPEC researchers do (see above), 
that there is more to human being than discourse alone, only then to disallow an 
ontological commitment in the psychological study of human being, is circumscribed to 
say the least.  Mine is not a call to reify accounts of human being in a similar manner to 
first nature psychologies.  Rather, I point to the advantages of psychologists discussing 
their own positions concerning ethical matters, admitting to the context and history of 
human being and committing (if they so choose) to accepting or changing what 
constitutive potentials (i.e. discursive resources) are available.  The DPEC/DPOC 
distinction is not supercilious (Edley, 2001) nor is the pursuit of ontological 
constructionism oxymoronic (Drewery, 2000) because inquiries, particularly in 
psychology, can and should discuss these possibilities beyond the constraints of 
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buttressed method fetishisms.  So, other than by reification or refrain, how could 
constructionism accommodate humanity’s ontology?            
 
Shotter 
 
Shotter calls for us to acknowledge that our ways of knowing are situated within our 
ways of being.  As he puts it:  
 
It is this kind of knowledge – of the provisions and resources we make 
available to ourselves for the realisation of our different possible next forms of 
social behaviour – that is the special kind of knowledge embodied in the world 
of a civil society.  And it is this that we must try and understand: both the 
nature of these socio-historical resources, and the nature of the social activities 
in which they are produced (1993, p. 3).   
 
I attempted to do just this in a study concerning discursive practices supporting State 
sanctioned exclusion in the Australian State of Queensland (Corcoran, 2006).  In this 
research two data sets, legislation and psychological questionnaires, were analysed and 
compared with semi-structured interviews to explore the kinds of discursive resources 
made available to and used by young males who had been either formally excluded from 
school or incarcerated for the first time.  The study’s conclusion drew attention to the 
dialogic relationships engaged between the way institutional practices talk about those 
they exclude and how recipients of exclusion speak about themselves (see Corcoran, 
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2003 or 2005, for more detailed analysis).  I argued that first nature accounts of 
personhood, prevalent in legislative and clinical discourse, do little more than pathologise 
and morally denigrate people under sanction.  As a result, institutional and disciplinary 
practices often fail to attend to the ways in which they are responsible to the joint action 
taking place and consequently, these practices overlook valuable opportunities to 
contribute to the promotion of people’s psychosocial wellbeing.  I will return to the latter 
point in the final section below.     
 
Shotter’s (1993) ideas regarding knowledge of the third kind are central to the present 
discussion.  Critical of first nature attempts at knowledge production, Shotter contends 
that there are neglected forms of knowledge that speak to what it is to act as socially 
dexterous human beings.  The difficulty, according to Shotter, is that our use of restrictive 
methods (e.g. statistical regression) obfuscates our appreciation of what exists between us 
in the living moments of our everyday lives.  To counter this he rallies behind an appeal 
for method as tool-and-result (Vygotsky, 1978) suggesting that knowledges of the third 
kind, these practical-moral forms of knowledge, may become accessible from within our 
daily practices through alternate means.  As he says:   
 
Usually, if asked to reflect upon the process of speaking, we ‘see through’ the 
speech we use, that is, we see ‘from’ what we say ‘to’ either its effects, or ‘to’ 
its meanings; its prosthetic functioning remains ‘invisible’ to us.  We fail to 
notice it because, in speaking, we act ‘through’ our utterances in ‘making 
sense’.  But clearly, if this account is correct, as a very special form of 
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“psychological instrument”, linguistic signs possess what might be called a 
‘prosthetic-tool-text ambiguity’, the three different aspects each becoming 
visible according to the different ‘direction’ of our view: Acting towards the 
future, prospectively and creatively, in the saying of an utterance, we attempt 
to use it both prosthetically, as a device ‘through’ which to begin to express 
our meanings, and, as a tool-like means to ‘move’ other people (1993, p. 117-
118; emphasis in original). 
 
Note that Shotter emphasises the act, in this instance ‘saying’, as vital to the process of 
understanding human being and thus requiring our particular attention.  This is because in 
attempting to access such knowledge understanding must take place ‘from within’ the act 
itself.  As he puts it: “a shift away from knowing by ‘looking at’ to a way of knowing by 
being ‘in contact, or in touch with’ ” (ibid, p. 20).  In historical terms, psychology moves 
from first nature observations and more recent ontologically distanced explanations to 
DPOC accounts situated within and explicitly committed to the form of life under 
construction.    
 
Chouliaraki 
 
Chouliaraki, like Shotter, draws on the constructionist argument that discourse is 
constitutive of social practice including practices involving personhood.  Knowledge 
products accordingly are understood to be discursively developed and historically 
provisional in what she labels a ‘post-positivist’ epistemology.  Paralleling Foucault 
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(2000a), critical importance is granted to the appearance and influence of power within 
meaning-making processes.  As Chouliaraki states: 
 
…discourse sets up a constitutive relationship between meaning and power 
within social practice: every move to signification comes about from a 
position of power – power both structuring and structured by the social 
positions available within a practice.  And every move to signification makes 
a claim to truth precisely from that power position that enunciates it – this is 
not the ‘truth’, but always a truth effect, a truth that seeks to re-constitute and 
re-establish power through meaning (2002, p. 84). 
 
Chouliaraki directly warns us that one-size-fits-all scientific methods can not account for 
our socially situated and ethically constituted ways of being.  This issue, as I have argued, 
is of no greater import to psychological studies than when accounts of human being are 
usurped by method fetishisms.  If, as Hepburn (2006) suggests, critical psychology’s aim 
is to ‘disrupt rather than destroy’ the sense of security that comes with method fetishisms, 
pronouncements like those tendered by DPEC practitioners evidently lack an awareness 
of their own power and the effects of their own discourse.    
 
Chouliaraki marries constructionist ontology with a critical realist epistemological 
position and the union is achieved in a particularly interesting way.  The crux of her 
argument relies on a pretext which avoids compulsion to a singular, definitively specified 
reality.  It does so by leaning considerably on Derrida’s account of signification and how 
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his theory extends to questions of epistemology.  Chouliaraki puts it this way: “If every 
object is constituted through reiteration of the semiotic (its capacity for repeated 
performative acts), then we cannot talk about the ‘real’ outside its inscription within the 
regimes of signification that discourse establishes” (op. cit., p. 92).  Immediately, a link is 
established with Shotter’s account of knowing from within.  Chouliaraki goes on to state 
that whilst our worlds may phenomenologically appear to us as real objects these may be 
better understood as ‘truth effects’.  She says: “…although the social world is constituted 
in articulations of meaning and power, our ways of knowing about it (our meta-
languages) construe social practice ‘as if’ it were ‘real’ – which means provisionally 
accepting the ‘immediate givenness’ of the various dimensions that are at play within a 
practice” (ibid, p. 97).  The second part of this statement returns us to Bakhtin (1981) 
who warned that isolating discourse from ‘the impulse that reaches out beyond it’ 
inevitably offers less than what could otherwise have been understood from the action 
taking place.  Thus, if dedicated to the pursuit of personal, relational and collective 
wellness in contemporary societies psychological knowledges must firstly be aware of 
and then secondly reconstruct the boundaries of what is discursively available as situated 
provisions and resources i.e. person-oriented grammars, in human activity.  These 
discursive resources directly enable (or disable) possibilities for enacted futures and in 
social practices such possibilities invariably constrain prospective action.  
 
Perhaps a perspective from professional practice is relevant here.  In the course of 
therapeutic relationships I believe every effort should be made by the therapist not to get 
ahead, in a dialogic sense, of the client.  To advance beyond what is collaboratively and 
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dialogically meaningful often distances the client from the present conversation and 
potentially impedes future therapeutic developments.  Similarly, Potter and others have 
developed (and continue to develop) an important challenge to psychology but the value 
of DP may be fatigued by the disparity between where we, as a discipline and society are 
situated at present, and where DPEC wishes to take us.  As stated above, I hold a sincere 
appreciation of many of the precepts maintained by DP but I believe DPEC has moved at 
a pace detrimental to its acceptability both inside and outside the academy.  In an effort to 
remain on message, DPEC’s methodological commitment, in lieu of an ontological one, 
leaves it notionally impoverished.  Here is one example: 
 
While opposing the cognitivist assumption that talk is driven by the workings 
of an inner life of the mind, that is not the end of the matter.  The status of it 
as a poor general theory of language and mind does not prevent people from 
making use of it as a way of talking.  This is not merely a matter of people 
making false theoretical assertions such as ‘I think in my head’, but of talking 
as if that were the case, as part of talk’s everyday practices.  There are 
practical, common sense uses of such a notion, that a person’s words may be 
produced or taken on occasions, to be expressions of a private and prior realm 
of mental life.  This can be a practical basis for talking and doing things with 
words, whose investigation requires no commitment to mentalism on the 
analyst’s part (Edwards & Potter, 2005, p. 244, emphasis in original). 
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The most significant impression left by this account is the recognition, matching 
Chouliaraki’s above, that people talk about psychological phenomena using an as if or 
metaphorical premise.  This sense of the imaginary facilitates an understanding of the 
constitutive potentials of language in the construction of our psychosocial worlds.  But 
whilst Edwards and Potter acknowledge this, they restate their position suggesting that it 
is possible to investigate such discourse without committing to a belief in mentalism.  
The problem is this: the commitment to mentalism that people employ in their own 
accounts of everyday activity is, whether psychologists agree with it or not, a 
commitment regarding how they understand themselves to be.  It is, to most people, 
simply a way of being.  As I have been arguing, an ethical void is created (and ensues) 
because DPEC fails to offer any ontological premise (metaphoric or otherwise) with 
which people may connect.  Wetherell puts the case of DPEC emphatically: 
 
Our approach instead has been to go empirical and turn attention to describing 
the ways in which ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ become practical issues for people 
engaged in their local moral orders.  We analyse agency as a discursive 
resource rather than a state or an essence (2005, p. 170). 
 
It is all very well ‘to go empirical’ but for such theory to mean something to the people it 
is supposedly about it must make some effort to engage with them in a language which 
can be potentially shared.  Psychology can discuss person-oriented discourse without 
essentialising or depersonalising such ideas - the challenge directly facing DPEC is to do 
so without leaving its humanity behind.  This call, I am disappointed to say, is not too 
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dissimilar to the disgruntled complaints laid against first nature accounts by social 
psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s (see e.g. Gergen, 1985; Parker, 1989; Shotter, 
1975).  
 
Resourcing joint action for wellbeing 
 
I have already outlined how movement toward specification (or stabilisation as 
Chouliaraki put it) in psychological research has generally prefaced first nature accounts 
to understand human being.  Whilst these reductionist accounts continue to be employed 
by the discipline, as in deficit or pathology-based psychological explanation, it is 
questionable whether these actively promote health and well being in our communities 
(Gergen, 1991; Prilleltensky, 1994).  Could a similar criticism be made of DPEC 
approaches on account of their failure to provide an ontological commitment to the 
people they study?  Contributions from critical health psychology (CHP) add 
significantly to this discussion providing criterion by which to compare second nature 
accounts.  Murray (2004) has outlined four associated areas of activity for CHP.  The first 
involves the use of reflexive, moral and relational kinds of psychological theory.  He also 
endorses the view that meanings within cultures should be understood as mediated and 
constantly changing.  Secondly, a focus on context is maintained via advocacy for social 
justice concerns.  The third aspect highlighted looks to research methods that are ethical, 
critical and qualitative.  Finally, the practice of CHP is intended to be community based 
and aimed at providing conditions that enable psychological health.  I now turn to 
contrast DPOC and DPEC along these dimensions to further differentiate their positions.   
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The main argument laid out here suggests that whilst some versions of constructionism 
acknowledge the forms of life within which claims to understanding are made others 
choose to side step or devalue the issue by placing epistemology before ontology.  It is a 
step, as Wittgenstein said, that at times escapes our notice:  
 
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviourism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice.  We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided.  
Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them – we think.  But that is 
just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.  For we have 
a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better.  (The 
decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one that we thought quite innocent.) – And now the analogy which was to 
make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces.  So we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.  And now it looks as 
if we had denied mental processes.  And naturally we don’t want to deny them 
(1953, no. 308; my emphasis).  
 
In relation to CHP’s first criteria, most DPEC research goes some way to acknowledging 
the situatedness of local moral orders in the action under analytic attention (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and as such is not, in Wittgenstein’s terms, an 
entirely unexplored medium.  But whilst DPEC holds onto its A-ontological position it 
 25
remains caught within an epistemologically directed form of nescience.  This point was 
clearly made by Drewery: “…analysing how descriptions are interactionally managed 
simply cannot be done without reflexivity.  Such analysis of discourse cannot be 
undertaken without some form of engagement in the context of the discursive production.  
The ‘epistemic constructionist’ cannot hide from the fact that his [sic] practice is also 
positioned” (2000, p. 80).  In other words, it is not only research participant’s orientations 
that are meaningful to the practice of psychology but equally the researcher’s as well.     
 
Potter, in response to criticisms such as these, asks us to consider whether data would 
present as is or whether it would in fact exist at all if something life-threatening (e.g. 
being hit by a car) happened to a researcher on their way to work.  The crux of his 
argument is in “highlighting the researcher’s central place in the production of 
conventional research data, and highlighting the virtue of material where the researcher’s 
active role is minimised” (2002, p. 539).  Potter’s position is a fair response to the 
supposed objectivity of positivism and the limited accountability most researchers 
assume in influencing the outcomes of experimental studies (Danziger, 1990; Howard, 
1985).  However, DPEC research, with its dedication to ‘naturalistic’ data and 
conversation analysis (CA) methodology, can not evade criticism.   As Stokoe and 
Smithson point out: 
 
Typically, when analysts talk about members, they refer only to participants in 
the fragments of transcript they analyse.  They rarely include the analyst as a 
member.  We argue that analysts are also members and bring to bear their 
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common-sense knowledge in the process of analysis.  In order to make any 
leap from what speakers say (a simple paraphrase) to analytic commentary, 
researchers must draw upon their own interpretive resources.  This is left 
unacknowledged and implicit in CA…[and] if analysts draw upon their 
member’s knowledge, then their own position and agenda is necessarily 
woven into analysis (2001, p. 226; emphasis in original). 
 
By the very act of selection the researcher lays their own imprint upon the data to be 
analysed.  Likewise, the process of analysis itself cannot be portrayed as untouched by a 
reliance on the commonly used DPEC argument that states: “when it comes to analysing 
‘accounts’, there is a significant distinction to be made, between treating these as the 
ways participants see things, and treating them as forms of social action” (Edwards, 1997, 
p. 79).  I agree with Edwards that “the task is to examine and explicate the bases on 
which social life is made recognisable and intelligible to, and by, participants” (ibid, p. 
79; emphasis in original).  But as psychologists surely we can sensitively discuss how 
forms of life, available for analysis in our use of certain discourses, are enacted in our 
ethical socio-political relational engagements – research practices included.  As I have 
been arguing, is this not what Shotter suggested to be knowing from within joint action?  
This kind of community-based (and potentially globally relevant) action explicitly 
commits psychology to look for ways toward critical health promotion.  
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Conclusion           
         
The pragmatic benefits stimulated by Shotter’s constructionist account and Chouliaraki’s 
version of critical realism allow for reflexive consideration of the nature of embodied and 
discursive contexts and opens options divergent to dominant disciplinary explanations 
and DPEC positions.  It is within these actions that a selection of ontological skills 
(Shotter, 1993) relative to the indexicals of personhood may be engaged and explored for 
the ways in which they support or resist specification and enable (or disable) the pursuit 
of wellness in our communities.  Whether a community, its institutions and peoples 
reflexively acknowledge the forms of life they create will be testament to their 
willingness to perceive and act on the need and potential for change.  Whether DPEC can 
and is willing to work with DPOC to provide an alternative to first nature accounts may 
foreshadow DP’s own existence in the language games of human being.  As Drewery 
suggests: “Once we understand how different forms of subjective experience are 
produced, it seems to me that we have a responsibility to move forward to thinking about 
what forms of subjectivity would be preferred, and how different ways of speaking 
produce more and less preferred subjectivities” (2005, p. 306).  As practicing 
psychologists each of us work under explicit ethical arrangements in our relationships 
with people and communities.  In this work – for we are all practitioners – we must 
responsibly favour our duty of care by writing and/or speaking about preferred ways of 
being as if they were second nature. 
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